Vortrag von Prof. Dr. Catherine Roux, Universität Basel, im BERG-Research Seminar am 16.06.26

Das Institut für VWL freut sich ankündigen zu können, dass Prof. Dr. Catherine Roux, Universität Basel, innerhalb des BERG-Research Seminar einen Vortrag zum Thema

Procuring New Ideas: On the Value of Performance Information in Innovation Tournaments

halten wird.

Termin ist Dienstag, der 16. Juni 2026, von 15.00h (s.t.) – 16.00h in Raum F21/01.30

Abstract

We use a stylized model of a dynamic innovation tournament to show that the effectiveness of monetary incentives depends on whether contestants receive cardinal, ordinal, or no information about their rival's performance. The model's main implication is that performance information acts as a substitute for prize money in creating incentives to invest in new ideas: The investment-maximizing information policy switches from no to ordinal to cardinal information as the tournament's prize is reduced. A laboratory experiment provides support for our theory but also unveils an unpredicted pattern of behavior capable of overturning the model's conclusions concerning optimal policy.