Detaching “Emerging” from “Power”: Brazil and India at the WTO Ministerial in 2008

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Laura Carsten, June 2010

Terms like “emerging powers,” which appear with ever-greater frequency in literature concerning states like Brazil, India, Russia or China, imply a focus on power-based ideas like influence and autonomy as primary determinants for the foreign policy decisions of these states. This is particularly the case in their policy decisions vis-à-vis international economic institutions like the IMF or the WTO, which are often presented as bastions of institutionalized power. Such perceptions have been reinforced by the governments of these states through participation in events, like the BRIC Summit in Yekaterinburg in June 2009 or multiple IBSA Summits, designed to emphasize the distinctiveness and strength of these states sandwiched between the industrialized and the developing worlds.

Given this emphasis on power as a motivating goal for emerging power (EP) states, analyses which accept the implicit assumption of power hierarchies in these terms often argue that foreign policy remains the preserve of political elites in these states. This argument seems obvious for autocratic (China) or pseudo-democratic (Russia) states, but less so for stable democracies like India and Brazil. Nonetheless, it persists, emphasizing policy isolation in Brazil and India through layers of corruption (Two Americas November 14, 2009), bureaucratic nightmares, and institutional structures which only grant access to already a select group of domestic actors, if any at all (Hurrell and Narlikar 2006, 417; Marconini 2009, 152-155). Elites in these “Power-Hungry EPs” orient both foreign and foreign economic policy to geopolitical purposes, attempting to maximize their international influence while minimizing limits to their autonomy of sovereign action (citing Veiga 2009, ??; Nayar and Paul 2003, 11).

Other strands of literature, however, present a totally different picture. Here, descriptions of these states underline their growing economic capacity and a determination to develop this further as the states’ primary goal. In other words, economic interests are the primary determinant of these states’ foreign policies. EPs in this literature are “marked by pragmatism” (Roelofse-Campbell 2006, 16), focused on “practicable and measurable effort, rather than the global ‘talk-shop’ approach” (Miller 2005, 52) and interested in “diverse alliances of a more pragmatic than ideological characters” (Almeida 2007, 10). Such work often argues the governments
of these “Pragmatic EPs” are quite responsive to organized domestic interest groups, even when doing so may not make economic sense. Jawara and Kwa (2003) note, for example, trace India’s stubbornness towards the opening of the Doha Round of trade negotiations in 2001 to the 25,000 person protest against the round in New Delhi the week before the meeting in Qatar. Likewise, Rios (2006, 231) argues the restructuring of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas negotiations in 2003 represented a “race to the bottom” in terms of ambition as participating countries, and especially Brazil, decreased their ambition to avoid politically painful market concessions.

Admittedly, other strands of the literature admit both economic and power-based goals as being important for EPs, though even here the relationship between these goals is unclear. Some work argues power-based goals are tools to achieve economic ones. For example, Landsberg (2006, 4-5) claims the IBSA states seek more influence in order to better distribute the economic gains of globalization. Other work argues in the opposite direction, namely that economic goals are merely tools to achieve power-based goals. Examples here include Hurrell’s argument (2006, 18) that liberalization for EPs is simply a means of gaining power, or Ikenberry’s (2008, 5) that, as state power is “ultimately based on sustained economic growth,” China must integrate to “be a world power.” Finally, a third group sets these goals parallel to one another. Nel and Stephen (2008, 2), for example, argue EPs try to maximize economic gains from global governance as it is while simultaneously trying to influence the reform of global governance rules to better suit their national interests. As might be expected, the positions of these strands of literature regarding EP government responsiveness are a mixed bag.

All of these contrasting arguments suggest several questions that need answers to expand understanding of the EPs and their policymaking. What informs the policy decisions of EP states? And how responsive are these governments to organized interests within their borders? This paper first explores the relationship between power-based and economic goals through discourse analysis of the participation of two emerging powers, Brazil and India, in the World Trade Organization (WTO) mini-ministerial meeting held in Geneva between July 21 and July 30, 2008. Second, it seeks to shed some light on the responsiveness of EP governments to domestic interest groups by correlating industry group and government commentary in each case.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the theoretical framework, variables, and methodology to be employed. The third section contextualizes and gives a brief description of the proceedings in Geneva in July 2008. The fourth and fifth sections present the case studies of India and Brazil in Geneva, respectively. The final section concludes.

Theoretical Framework and Operationalization

Given the systemic approach which often dominates many accounts of these states and their ambitions (Drezner 2007, Nolte 2007, Evenett 2007, Ikenberry 2008, among others), this paper seeks to complement the existing literature by applying a societal approach (Moravcsik 1997, Schirm 2009). This provides an opportunity not just to test whether a different approach results in different conclusions regarding EP foreign economic policy motivations, but also picks up on suggestions in the literature to extend the concept of power beyond the traditional constraints of structural realism. As Barnett and Duvall note (2005, 41), “the failure to develop alternative conceptualizations of power limits the ability of international relations scholars to understand how global outcomes are produced and how actors are differentially enabled and constrained to determine their fates.” Thus examining the behavior of EP delegations from the perspective of their responsiveness to domestic interest groups should shed some light on the role played by neorealist, power-based ideas versus the role played by liberal economic interests inside the political process of pluralistic states. In addition, doing so helps explore not just the differences between EPs Brazil and India – whose different economic compositions easily explain their differing stances towards the issues at hand in Geneva in 2008 – but also seeks to highlight the commonalities in policymaking processes within these states, thus fleshing more meaning into the concept of “emerging powers.”

These case studies are appropriate to this purpose for several reasons. First, trade plays an increasingly important role in these states’ foreign economic policies (Martinez-Diaz and Brainard 2009, 2; Varshney 2007). Further, their recent emphasis on mixed trade strategies, incorporating bilateral, regional, interregional and multilateral efforts, suggests an exploration of what factors influence why and how EPs behave in the WTO is needed. Second, described by Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim as “the most evolved” of Brazil’s multilateral instruments (MRE August 6, 2008), the WTO is an appropriate forum for both Power-Hungry and Pragmatic EPs to pursue their goals. For Power-hungry EPs, the relatively equal
voice opportunities provided by a consensus decision-making process are an ideal platform not just to demonstrate one’s power, but also to promote the idea of oneself as powerful through dialogue and coalition-building. For Pragmatic EPs, on the other hand, the WTO is a forum with the potential to greatly increase market access worldwide and, in so doing, positively impact the economies of these states. Finally, Brazil and India have been pragmatically chosen as the easiest cases within the group of states labeled as emerging powers in which to test government responsiveness to domestic lobbying. This is not just because of the democratic nature of their governments, which implies at least a minimum of responsiveness to voter preferences, but also a result of the well-developed civil societies and strong communication infrastructure in these states, which ensure higher levels of industry participation and facilitate access to data in the form of statements.

The case studies will undertake a discourse analysis of statements of two types of actors, industry group representatives and elected or appointed public officials. These actors have been chosen in a way as to maximize the credibility of their statements. The standard methodological criticism of discourse analysis is also the most obvious: one can find a statement to support any given position, especially in politics. As Potter and Wetherell (1995, 48) argue, the variety in the description of a certain topic results from the different actions different participants hope to achieve through what they say. The key here is that, in both groups of actors whose discourse will be examined, the actions the actors hope to achieve are the same across each group: the government officials considered here all seek re-election (whether for themselves or for their parties) and industry groups all want their preference vis-à-vis a certain policy to become government policy. Thus, though an actor may represent a topic differently based upon his or her audience or the situation in which the actors find themselves (Fuhrman and Oehler 1986, 296), these actors are united in attaining goals which directly impact their well-being and which they will consequently pursue using the most effective means available. For this reason, other actors, such as experts, are excluded as they are neither decision-makers nor accountable to domestic actors for their positions (Schirm 2009, 507).

The case studies cover statements made between May 1 and August 30, 2008. This period includes three months of preparatory work leading up to the meeting, the duration of the meeting itself, and one month of recriminations following its failure. Statements made during the preparatory period reflect the domestic
negotiation process between industry groups and the respective governments; those made during the mini-ministerial, the results of these negotiation processes inside the EPs; and those after the meeting, an evaluation of the priorities set and the positions taken during the meeting. Thus, analysis of this time frame highlights the various roles played by economic interests and power-based ideas throughout the entire process of foreign policymaking vis-à-vis the WTO mini-ministerial.

Government statements are taken from the responsible ministry websites, including press releases, speeches, and press briefings by responsible government officials, as well as from major periodicals accessed through the LexisNexis database. Similarly, industry group statements are taken from the websites of the industry groups themselves, in the form of press releases, statements by industry group leaders, and public letters to the government, as well as from the periodicals in LexisNexis.

The discourse analysis seeks to build a correlation between the presence of the independent variables of economic interests and power-based ideas and the dependent variable of the positions taken by the Brazilian and Indian delegations at the mini-ministerial in Geneva. Economic interests are defined as the economic actions which, when implemented, cause benefits to accrue to various private actors as a result of state strategic decisions. Under the theoretical scope of Moravcsik’s liberal theory of international politics (1997), this definition assumes the domestic interaction of these actors’ interests will ultimately determine the state’s policy position, which is subsequently projected to the rest of the world. Given the WTO’s primary purpose is to liberalize market access through multilateral negotiation, the economic interests traced in this paper will be those thematically related to this purpose. These include market liberalization, market protection, and economic cooperation in the field of trade. Market liberalization is gaining access to new markets. Market protection is preventing other states from gaining access to new markets. Finally, economic cooperation in trade is the act of cooperating to affect trade flows either positively or negatively.

Citing Parsons (2002, 48), “ideas are subjective claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions.”

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1. The responsible ministries are the Department of Commerce and Industry (DoC) for India and the Ministry of External Relations (MRE) for Brazil. In addition, statements made by heads of government for each country are included.
2. A table listing the indicators used for each economic interest and idea in the analysis can be found in Appendix I.
Power-based ideas, on the other hand, are conceptions of the world, relationships, or actions which define sought-for interdependencies between actors. Given this paper’s attempt to expand the neorealist concepts of power into other international relations traditions, the two relevant power-based ideas here are autonomy and influence. Autonomy is defined as a state’s ability to pursue its goals despite limitations imposed upon it through external constraints, such as participation in governance regimes and agreements. This definition incorporates both the traditional idea of autonomy, as independence from external constraints, as well as a newer concept often found in the globalization literature which emphasizes “autonomy through participation” (Lima and Hirst 2006, 24; also Nolte 2007). In other words, it does not by definition exclude states participating in international institutions from seeking autonomy. Influence, on the other hand, can be either direct or indirect. Direct influence represents the Dahl’s classic 1957 definition of power: “the ability of A to get B to do something B would not normally do” (Riker 1964, 342). Indirect influence is the ability to shape the system to reflect your goals and norms (Schirm 1994, 36-38) as well as the ability to shape what others want (Nye 1990, 181).

In addition to tracing the economic interests and power-based ideas listed above in industry commentary and government statements, the idea of development will also be included as a control. Why include development? High levels of income inequality, widespread poverty and underdeveloped infrastructure, among other things, reinforce what Hurrell (2006, 16) calls “imperatives of economic development” in these states. Consequently, it can be logically expected that, if any idea appears in the foreign economic policy positions of these states, this idea should appear, especially in the context of a trade round entitled the Doha Development Agenda. Second, why use development as an idea rather than an economic interest? Development is certainly a major policy goal of many states and is also primarily achieved through economic actions such as building infrastructure or facilitating the creation and improvement of various sectors. It is not, however, an economic action in itself, but, rather, the goal orienting states to implement certain economic actions. In other words, development is the end and not the means, and therefore exists on a different plane from economic interests like liberalization or economic cooperation. Development is defined here as creating and maximizing gains from a stable and prosperous macroeconomic environment while minimizing social inequalities in distribution of the benefits from this process. Its inclusion is intended to test the role
played by ideas versus interests in EP policymaking. Hence, should statements show that economic interests and not power-based ideas dominate government statements in the analysis, the inclusion of the idea of development will help determine whether this represents the absence of power or the absence of ideas in the policymaking process in these states.

WTO Mini-Ministerial Meeting, July 21-July 30, 2008: Contextualization in the DDA

The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) round of trade negotiations - the first of its kind under the scope of the WTO - started in November 2001. Negotiations have been marked by confrontation between so-called Northern and Southern states, with the primary fight centering on developing countries’ refusal to open non-agricultural markets and industrialized states’ refusal to open their agricultural markets. The Round, which was planned to conclude by December 2005, passed that deadline, having failed to reach an agreement. In July 2006, it was suspended by WTO Director General (DG) Pascal Lamy, but resumed half a year later and proceeded in baby steps toward the mini-ministerial meeting in July 2008 in Geneva.

The mini-ministerial itself brought together ministers from roughly 40 countries on July 21, 2008 for meetings intended to start resolving remaining issues and to outline the next steps for the Round. Issues included agreeing upon modalities for agricultural and non-agricultural market access (NAMA), as well as concluding discussion of services and rules (WTO 2010, The July 2008 Package). On Wednesday, July 23, the meetings moved from the Green Room and the Trade Negotiations Committee to an even smaller group: the G7, comprising the United States (US), the European Union (EU), Japan, China, India, Brazil and Australia (Pomeroy and Palmer July 23, 2008). The G7, which was described by USTR Susan Schwab as “the core group of seven leading members from the developed and developing world,” was the primary negotiating group throughout the rest of the negotiations (Doha Round Talks Sways, Shows Signs of Breakdown July 29, 2008).³ Negotiations were in trouble by Friday, July 25, as the G7, specifically India, failed to accept the compromise text drafted by DG Lamy with the chairs of agricultural and NAMA negotiations (Blustein 2009, 267). A deal between Brazil and the US, however, in which the US agreed to lower its subsidy cap in exchange for Brazil deepening industrial tariff cuts, kept things going over the weekend (Miller July 29,

³ Insert interview about the disproportionate leading roles Brazil and India play in the WTO versus their share of global trade?
2008). Ultimately, the negotiations failed when the United States, China and India failed to agree on the appropriate trigger level for the special safeguard mechanism proposed to protect developing country farmers from agricultural import surges (Implications of the Failure of WTO Talks July 29, 2008).

The failure of the mini-ministerial in Geneva in 2008 was heralded by many as the death of the Doha Round and by some even for the WTO itself (for example, The Doha Round…and Round…and Round August 2, 2008). Work, however, has continued. The Seventh Ministerial Conference was held in Geneva in late 2009 to discuss “The WTO, the Multilateral Trading System and the Current Global Economic Environment”, but produced no significant progress. As DG Lamy noted in a speech to the Trade Negotiations Committee on June 11, 2010:

There is no other way to get to the result we all want than by consistent hard work for as long as it takes. [...] If there is one thing which remains crystal clear in all of our minds it is that we cannot, I repeat, cannot have an ambitious result without overall balance. Such is our challenge — to aim for high ambition while ensuring balance (WTO June 11, 2010).

India at the Mini-Ministerial

The Indian negotiating team, and especially its leader, Commerce Minister Kamal Nath, played a very visible role throughout the negotiations and were very vocal about India’s goals in participating in the talks. Data gathered from government statements and media coverage of the negotiations revealed five industries expected to be affected, positively or negatively, by the final WTO deal: agriculture, automobiles and automobile components, textiles, gems and jewelry, as well as the IT-BPO services sector. In addition to statements from the respective industry associations, statements from the apex industry bodies which represent multiple industries – the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (Assocham) – will also be included given the broad scope of the Doha negotiations.4

Economic interests dominated power-based ideas in the discourse of the industry associations reviewed. In numbers, while economic interests appeared in 58.3% of the industry statements, power-based ideas appeared in only 3.3%. Specifically, of the economic interests traced, protectionist positions represented the largest percentage (40.0%), with liberalization appearing about half as frequently

4 A complete list of Brazilian and Indian industry groups examined can be found in Appendix II.
Specific calls for cooperation were absent. Industry fears in the protectionist statements varied, ranging from worries about job loss to a loss of investment to increased competition from cheaper imports resulting from lower tariffs - all of which were expected to unduly impact the livelihood and even the existence of the industries. Statements evidencing liberalization, on the other hand, indicated the hope by industry groups that an eventual Doha deal would result in market access gains via the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers. An example of each type of statement can be found below:

- Dilip Chenoy, director general, Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers' (Siam), on the negotiations: “The auto industry in India does not support any sectoral agreement in the automotive sector as it would mean bringing down the duties to 0% on a sectoral basis” (Caution! NAM A Bend Ahead June 28, 2008)
- FICCI Secretary General Amit Mitra: “Indian business is relying on the services negotiations to have effective market access in the areas of professional and other business services in developed countries” (FICCI Seeks Market Access for Indian Service-Providers at WTO July 21, 2008).

As to ideas present in industry group statements, power-based ideas were dominated here too by the idea of development. Whereas 23.3% of the statements emphasized the importance to the industry groups of the government’s policies facilitating development, only 3.3% emphasized power-based ideas as a goal. Of this 3.3%, these represented exclusively calls for increased autonomy. The development statements represented a mix of statements supporting development generally, those calling for development aspect of the Doha mandate to be supported, and those emphasizing “special and differential treatment” for developing countries. The statements calling for autonomy, on the other hand, emphasized the inability of the WTO to close the Doha Round and, thus, provide a more liberal multilateral trading system. An example of each is below:

- Krishan Bir Chaudhary, President of Bharatiya Krishak Samaj (the Indian Farmers’ Union): “[The] WTO is practically hopeless and helpless after successive failures of a series of attempts to revive the multilateral trade negotiations. […] Therefore, the Bharatiya Krishak Samaj has urged that WTO should be wind [sic] up immediately” (Farmers Happy Over Doha Failure; Want WTO’s Wind-Up July 31, 2008).
- Chandrajit Banerjee, Director General of the CII: “The present text does not reflect development imperatives of developing countries and therefore should be dropped” (India Inc Against Opening up SME-Prone Sectors at WTO July 23, 2008).
In sum, then, industry statements emphasize the importance of economic interests above everything else, followed by the idea of development with only a nominal presence of autonomy, the only power-based idea appearing in the statements.

What of government statements? The variables discovered in government statements follow closely those found in the industry group statements, with only minor changes of emphasis. Just like the Indian industry groups, Indian government officials emphasized economic interests (42.9%) over power-based ideas (2.2%) in their statements prior to, during and following the mini-ministerial. Also similar to the industry group statements, the economic interest of protection dominated the other interests, present in 24.2% of statements compared to liberalization in 16.5% and economic cooperation in 2.2%. Finally, also like in the industry statements, the idea of development demonstrates a significant presence in government statements, is at 26.4%, in fact, twelve times more present than the power-based ideas traced.

Statements emphasizing cooperation focused on the benefits of global integration. Protectionist statements focused on protecting infant industries and sensitive sectors as well as individual farmers and businesses, while liberalization statements were clear calls for increased market access. Examples of the latter can be found below:

- Minister Kamal Nath: “I made it very clear in these talks that I am willing to negotiate commerce. I am not willing to negotiate livelihood security, or small and infant industry […] We must remember that our manufacturing industry, auto, auto-components and textiles are all very infant and we cannot negotiate these” (No Compromise on Livelihood Issues, Kamal Nath Hits Back at Critics July 26, 2008).
- Minister Nath: In a statement, Nath “called upon the developed countries to cut huge subsidies on agriculture to provide a level playing field to the developing nations in the global market” (WTO Should Promote Equity: Kamal Nath August 12, 2008).

In other words, as you can see in Table 1, which summarizes the results of the case study, government statements were closely correlated with the wishes of the industry groups as expressed in their public statements. Only three differences between the two groups of statements appear. First, though both sets of statements evidenced protection as the primary economic interest present, this prominence was stronger in the industry statements (40.0% to only 18.3% for liberalization) than in government ones (24.2% to 16.5% for liberalization and 2.2% for cooperation). Second, the idea of development was noticeably more present in government statements than in industry ones. This suggests industry concerns for their own
livelihood were perhaps mediated in the policy process by the government’s own concern for fostering development both at home and abroad. Government statements including the idea of development, like their industry counterparts, represented a mix of calls for general development, for special and differential treatment and, most prominently, demands to abide by the development mandate of Doha. For example, Minister Nath said in a statement: “The focus of World Trade Organization (WTO) talks should be to reduce poverty in the world and not just to increase the prosperity of the wealthy nations” (WTO Should Promote Equity: Kamal Nath August 12, 2008). Notably, the industry’s economic interests do not appear to have been mediated by a presence of power-based ideas in the government statements but, rather, by the idea of development or, more strongly, by statements which could not be classified according to the variables employed here.

The third difference between the two groups of statements is that, although both groups showed a small presence of power-based ideas, the ideas present in each were different: whereas industry statements emphasized autonomy – that is, the ineffectiveness of the WTO and a desire to pursue trade liberalization through other means - government statements emphasized gaining influence within the WTO. Specifically, government statements indicate the government wanted their preferences heard and implemented, meaning these were calls to increase India’s indirect influence in the WTO. For example, Minister Nath argued prior to the meeting:

We had asked for a revised text before the Ministerial Meeting. We were not alone in this. This call has not been heeded. This issue has to be discussed in the Ministerial Meeting leading to a clear decision as an integral part of the outcome (DoC, July 25, 2008). This suggests the government was committed to multilateral trade liberalization as a process and the WTO as an institution despite industry pressure to focus on other mechanisms.

In sum, discourse analysis of industry and government commentary surrounding India’s participation in the mini-ministerial meeting of the WTO in Geneva in July 2008 indicates very little support for the argument that EP states are motivated primarily by power-seeking. India appears to be the Pragmatic EP, not the Power-hungry EP, in this case of foreign economic policymaking. Economic interests predominated both industry and government statements, followed by the idea of development with power-based ideas autonomy and influence only a distant third.
Also interesting, whereas industry groups capably transmitted their economic interests to the government, there is no correlation between the power-based ideas evident in industry statements and those found in government statements. Thus the case study simultaneously provides evidence for the literature claiming EPs are responsive to domestic groups and that claiming decision-makers in EPs are isolated from these groups. It also suggests that perhaps it would be illuminating to examine how different policy fields affect the degree of influence industry groups in EPs have on their government’s policies. (FIESP interview about Nath?)

Table 1: INDIA: WTO Mini-Ministerial Negotiations, Geneva, July 2008

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Brazil at the Mini-Ministerial

The Brazilian negotiating team, headed by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, like the Indian team, was vocal in presenting and defending Brazil’s interests at the meeting in Geneva. Government sources as well as press coverage of the mini-ministerial suggested a number of industries within Brazil which seemed most likely to be affected, positively or negatively, by the potential Doha deal. These included the ethanol, sugar and sugarcane, poultry, automobile, electronics and agriculture industries. Thus the industry groups for these industries were consulted for commentary. As in the case study above, given the scope of the negotiations and to control for the inclusion of both pro-liberalization and pro-protection industries, statements from three apex industry groups - the National Confederation of Industry (Confederação Nacional da Indústria, CNI), the Federation of Industries of Sao Paulo (Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo, FIESP) and the Brazilian Foreign

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5 Translations of statements examined which originally appeared in Portuguese are the result of a combination of author’s and automatic translation resulting from numerous online translation and dictionary programs, and are considered accurate representations of the original language. Fluent speakers of Brazilian Portuguese were consulted to verify translations if meanings remained unclear.
Economic interests dominated power-based ideas in the Brazilian industry commentary reviewed. In fact, none of the industry statements indicated the presence of power-based ideas, compared to 65% of the statements which included the presence of economic interests. Specifically, and in contrast to the Indian industry commentary, liberalization was the economic interest most commonly found in the Brazilian statements, appearing in 53.8% of the statements compared to protection in only 5% of the statements and economic cooperation in 6.3%. Statements concerning liberalization mostly called for an ambitious outcome to the negotiations in terms of market access, while the few protectionist statements demanded infant industry protection. Statements supporting economic cooperation were roughly evenly divided between calls for Northern and Southern trade partners but all emphasized the benefits of integration in the global market and cooperation with others. A sampling of the industry statements including economic interests is below:

- Director of the FIESP, Mario Marconini, on the proposed Doha deal: “A cost in lowering tariffs always exists, but the controlled opening is good for the country because it fortifies the economy” (Landim July 30, 2008).
- Jackson Schneider, president of the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers (Anfavea): The automotive sector was also pleased […] “Throughout the meetings, there was a strong position respecting the limits of the industry” (Landim July 30, 2008).
- Statement from the CNI: “The country is a global trader and, as such, maintaining trade relations with other countries is important” (Oliveira July 30, 2008).

As for ideas present in industry discourse, they were almost non-existent. No evidence of the power-based ideas was discovered, and only a single statement indicated the presence of development as an idea in the industry commentary. This statement, part of a communiqué from the CNI, argued “the support given to the Brazilian government showed that the industrial sector recognizes the importance of international trade as a means to accomplish sustainable development” (Industry Regrets Collapse of Doha Round July 30, 2008). Thus, in sum, that Brazilian industry commentary was characterized by an overwhelming emphasis on economic interests. The ideas traced, including power-based ones as well as development, made no or a nominal appearance, respectively.

Brazilian government statements were also dominated by the presence of economic interest as opposed to power-based ideas. Whereas economic interests
appeared in 41.2% of the statements reviewed, power-based ideas were present in only 11.5%. Of this 41%, the government showed itself overwhelmingly in favor of market liberalization, with 34.4% of the statements indicating the importance of this interest, versus 2.3% for protection and 5.3% for economic cooperation. Most of the liberalization statements were actually statements opposed to protection in the form of industrialized country agricultural subsidies and other distortions in the multilateral trading system. Protectionist statements emphasized the importance of flexibilities for industry and showed reluctance to face severe tariff cuts, while cooperation statements were evenly split between an emphasis on Northern and on Southern trade partners as being important for Brazil. A sampling of the statements featuring economic interests follows:

- President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva: “It is a very great shame that the rich countries subsidize their products to export and this causes great harm to competition, in other words, when we open our mouths to speak of free trade, it has to be free indeed. It cannot be half free” (MRE August 3, 2008).
- Minister Celso Amorim said attempts “to overload” the negotiations “by seeking to limit the flexibilities allowed under the formula” [...] “make mandatory deeper cuts above the formula average in some sectors” [...] “is a recipe for failure” (Deep Divisions Remain as WTO Meets to Broker Breakthrough Deal July 21, 2008).
- Minister Amorim: “At the WTO, the manner in which Brazil, China and India have already been collaborating within the G-20 framework demonstrates the potential for that kind of cooperation” (Amorim June 8, 2008).

Regarding the presence of ideas, Brazilian government discourse was the only set of statements examined with a significant presence of both ideas overall, meaning power-based ideas and the idea of development. In terms of power-based ideas, 11.5% of the statements suggested the presence of influence in the policymaking situation. The statements emphasize equal participation in global governance decision-making as well as the importance of incorporating all countries’ views in global governance decisions. In other words, like the Indian government’s statements, they are characterized by the presence of calls for increased indirect influence. For example, President Lula explained the behavior of US and EU negotiators in previous WTO negotiations and his expectations for their behavior in Geneva so:

The negotiators are “used to a time when they didn’t have to negotiate. They imposed what they wanted and the others were forced to accept. Today, they have to take into account the existence of emerging countries” (No WTO Deal Unless US, EU Make More Concessions: Lula July 23, 2008).
The presence of such ideas correspond to the implicit argument in terms like “emerging power” that these states want to play a more active role on the global stage and gain more control over global governance as it affects their states. However, the relative unimportance of such ideas within official discourse compared to the presence of economic interests like liberalization and cooperation warn against reading too much into this.

Statements evidencing the idea of development, on the other hand, underlined the large disparities between developed and developing countries, as well as the role emerging powers should play in narrowing this gap.

- Minister Amorim: “And the agricultural issue was very important for developing countries like Brazil, which are major agricultural exporters, as well as for poor countries, which currently are not major exporters, but could be if they were able to avoid facing the subsidies rich countries” (MRE August 6, 2008).
- President Lula, on why Brazil requested the EU and the US reduce their agricultural subsidies in the negotiations: “It is because we wanted that the poor countries to have a chance of selling its products in the rich countries [sic]” (MRE August 3, 2008).

Finally, although Brazilian government statements do follow the general structure of the industry discourse – with primary emphasis on economic interests, followed by development and power-based ideas – the correlation is not as straightforward as was the case in the India case study. Brazilian lobbying activity appears to have been more focused than that in India, with actors successfully conveying their desires to the government as indicated via the presence of economic interests in the statements analyzed (65.0% of industry to 41.2% in government). The government, however, appears to have followed its own course regarding the role of ideas in policymaking. Where power-based ideas and development only appeared in 0 and 1.3% of industry statements, respectively, they were present in 11.5 and 17.6% of government statements. The emphasis on development and indirect influence corresponds nicely to President Lula’s twin emphases of strengthening Southern partnerships and simultaneously trying to ensure that Brazil is no longer an “eternally emerging” country (Source?). It also underlines arguments by several academics and practitioners suggesting Brazilian trade policy is governed not by economic sense but by geopolitical aspirations. (Mario Marconini/Sandra Rios interviews).

Despite this, the overwhelming presence of economic interests in government statements and the fact that this corresponds to the industry group discourse, albeit
loosely, suggests that, even if power-based or geopolitical motivations are hidden in Brazilian trade policy positions, voter legitimation of such policies can still only be obtained by emphasizing the economic sense (even when there is none) and consequences of trade policy decisions. Unlike the Indian case, the Brazilian industry groups made no apparent attempt to influence the government regarding power-based ideas. This leaves unclear whether they felt themselves incapable of influencing the government in this area, whether the government was closed to petitions in this area, or whether the industry groups simply did not care, focusing rather on their core activities of promoting the economic welfare of the businesses and industries they represented.

Thus, as can be seen in Table 2, which summarizes the evidence, an analysis of Brazilian government and industry discourse shows the dominance of economic interests over power-based ideas or the idea of development in the policymaking situation. Although the economic interests important to industry groups did not appear in government statements to the same extent that they were present in industry statements, the relative structure of interests (with liberalization leading, followed by cooperation and then protection) remained the same. This evidences a high correlation between industry and government positions in the economic field. The correlation in terms of ideas is less clear. Did the lack of industry commentary on these topics leave the government a free hand to pursue its own goals? Or would it have pursued these goals anyway? Thus, though the case study provides some support for the assumption of the “Power-hungry EPs,” again the “Pragmatic EP” appears to prevail.

Table 2: BRAZIL: WTO Mini-Ministerial Negotiations, Geneva, July 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th></th>
<th>GOVERNMENT</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Interest</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protectionism</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Cooperation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-Based Ideas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Ideas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassifiable</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commentary on Negotiations</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement Totals</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

This paper has attempted to answer two related questions regarding foreign economic policymaking in emerging power states. First, what informs the policy decisions of EP states? And, second, how responsive are EP governments to organized interests within their borders? Two types of EPs were presented. The Power-hungry EP makes foreign policy decisions – economic or not – in order to increase the influence of the state in the international arena while simultaneously maintaining the autonomy to pursue its goals as it chooses. The Pragmatic EP’s foreign policy decisions are focused on providing tangible economic gains to the country and its businesses, and consequently reflect a minimal role for power-based ideas unless these advance the specific economic interest under consideration. Discourse analysis traced the presence of two independent variables, economic interests versus power-based ideas, and a control variable, the idea of development, inside government and industry commentary to build a correlation between these variables and the dependent variable of the positions taken by the Brazilian and Indian negotiating teams in Geneva. This analysis thus is a first attempt to discover the balance of these two EP personalities in their foreign economic policy.

In answer to the first question, the answer appears to be both economic interests and ideas, power-based and non-power-based. In both cases, and in contrast to a large section of the existent literature, power motivations played little role in determining government positions regarding the trade negotiations in Geneva. Interestingly, the analysis indicated that, when power was present in government discourse, it was present almost exclusively as indirect influence. This suggests that institutional affiliation may be an important determinant in EPs’ policymaking vis-à-vis international economic organizations. This variable could be included in future research in an attempt to explain the statements which could not be classified according to the variables employed here.

The importance of economic interests and the idea of development in EP foreign economic policy decisions as evidenced in the case studies is undeniable. This suggests that EPs will do whatever necessary to improve their economic position – including creating their own institutional options, via for example preferential trade agreements. Brazilian Minister Amorim, for example, noted following the failure in Geneva, “The WTO was a priority, because it is only here that we could address subsidies. But now we are going to have to concentrate on things
that bring results. I cannot be left hanging for another four years” (Chade July 31, 2008). The prioritization of multilateral institutions and its rules by EP states thus depends on these institutions’ effectiveness in fulfilling their purposes and on these purposes aligning with EPs’ own goals. This, in turn, reaffirms the importance of integrating these states into positions of power within these organizations, as has begun to happen via the inclusion of Brazil, India and China in small group negotiations in the WTO or via the quota increases for these countries in the IMF. Only by incorporating their views and goals into these institutions can the institutions’ legitimacy and EP participation be ensured in the long-run. In sum, then, the case studies suggest that both India and Brazil are overwhelmingly Pragmatic EPs. Their Power-hungry personalities are certainly present but appear to be strategically governed and directed toward fulfillment of specific economic policy goals.

In answer to the second question, the evidence suggests EP government responsiveness to industry groups depends on the policy area. While the specific economic preferences of the industry groups clearly corresponded to the positions taken by the government actors in both case studies, the ideas evident did not necessarily transmit. Specifically, government actors tended to place more emphasis on ideas in their positions than industry actors did. Although sometimes there was a close correlation between the ideas emphasized - for example, the idea of development in the Indian case - in most cases the presence of ideas was significantly larger in government statements as opposed to that found in industry statements. Explanations for the relative independence of government from industry ideas are unclear based upon these case studies. Where the Indian case suggests the government simply ignores industry group preferences on the ideas guiding policy decisions, the Brazilian suggests the industry groups themselves are not interested in lobbying for these ideas. [FIESP/Amcham Interview?] More research is needed in this area too.

Finally, what about potential commonalities between Brazil and India – two EP states with obviously opposing interests in trade but which are nonetheless often grouped together in analyses and, recently, in real life as well? Although the economic interests pursued differed, the positions of both states indicated both tend to be Pragmatic EPs in their trade policy, actively engagement in pursuit of these goals. Further, the positions taken in both states appear to be heavily influenced by
the lobbying efforts of domestic actors. Thus, the answer to Brawley’s question (1995, 92) about why we should assume that power and wealth move together is that, for EP states at least, we shouldn’t. But they do appear to live in similar neighborhoods within this group of states.

NOTES: [Process and include interviews in paper. Where? Conclusion? Or throughout as marked?] [Unclassifiable statements in case studies or just addressed at end? Addressed at all?] [Insert rules for statement selection and coding as appendix?]

Appendix I: Variable indicators used in the analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECONOMIC INTERESTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Cooperation (Coop)</td>
<td>Words and phrases indicating a desire for interstate cooperation in the field of trade; Words and phrases underlining the benefits of said cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization (Libz)</td>
<td>Words and phrases indicating actions related to increasing market access/trade partners; Words and phrases underlining the benefits resulting from exports and/or imports; Words and phrases highlighting the negative consequences of closing and/or keeping markets closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection (Prot)</td>
<td>Words and phrases indicating actions related to minimizing the negative consequences of free(r) trade; Words or phrases indicating the negative consequences of free(r) trade themselves; Words and phrases indicating a desire to close or keep markets closed; Words and phrases underlining the benefits of closing or keeping markets closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDEAS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy (Auton)</td>
<td>Words and phrases indicating a lack of support for the multilateral trading system or the principles underlying it; Words and phrases indicating displeasure with the restrictions of said system or pleasure in unrestricted action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence (Infl)</td>
<td>Words and phrases indicating a wish for more control over occurrences within the WTO or a desire to increase the ability of states to participate within it; Words and phrases delineating the responsibilities of various actors within the WTO; Words and phrases indicating a desire to or increase one’s ability to shape WTO rules or affect outcomes within it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development (Dev)</td>
<td>Words or phrases indicating a wish to support development in less privileged countries through a certain policy; Words or phrases indicating a need for special policies to ensure such development or to facilitate equal participation of developing countries internationally; Words and phrases indicating the importance of development within the multilateral trading system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix II: Industry associations examined by industry

### BRAZIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Industry Association(s) Reviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>National Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock of Brazil (Confederação da Agricultura e Pecuária, CNA); Brazilian Association of Seed Producers (Abrasem); Brazilian Agribusiness Association (Associação Brasileira de Agríbusines, ABAG); ARES - Institute for Responsible Agribusiness (Instituto para o Agronegócio Responsável); Permanent Forum on International Agricultural Negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobile and Automobile Parts</td>
<td>National Association of Automobile Manufacturers (Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores, ANFAVEA); Brazilian Association of Auto Parts Manufacturers (Sindicato Nacional da Indústria de Componentes para Veículos Automotores, Sindipeças)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>Brazilian Association of Electric &amp; Electronic Industry (Associação Brasileira da Indústria Elétrica e Eletrônica, ABINEE); Association of Brazilian Companies of Software and Information Services (Assespro Nacional, ASSESPRO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethanol</td>
<td>Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (União da Indústria de Cana-de-açúcar, UNICA); Brazilian Power Research Company (EPE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>Brazilian Poultry Producers and Exporters or Brazilian Chicken Producers and Exporters Association (ABEF); National Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock of Brazil (Confederação da Agricultura e Pecuária, CNA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar and Sugarcane</td>
<td>Sugarcane Growers Association of the Center South Region of Brazil (Organização dos Plantadores de Cana da Região Centro-Sul do Brasil, ORPLANA); Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### INDIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Industry Association(s) Reviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>The All India Agricultural Labour Association; the Farmer Entrepreneurs Association; Shetkari Sanghtana; Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU); the Seed Association of India; the Confederation of Indian Farmers Associations; the Federation of Farmers' Associations; Indian Coordination Committee of Farmers; Bharatiya Krishak Samaj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobile and Automobile Parts</td>
<td>The Society of Indian Auto Manufacturers (SIAM); Federation of Automobile Dealers Associations; Automotive Component Manufacturers Association (ACMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gems and Jewelry</td>
<td>All India Gems and Jewellery Trade Federation; Gems and Jewellery Export Promotion Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT-BPO Services</td>
<td>Manufacturers' Association for Information Technology; National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles and Garments</td>
<td>Confederation of Indian Textile Industry (CITI); the Southern Indian Mills' Association (SIMA); The Textile Association (India); the Clothing Manufacturers' Association of India; the Northern India Textile Mills Association (NITMA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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