

**The Implications of Innovations and Wage Structure Rigidity on Economic Growth and Unemployment:
A Schumpeterian Approach to Endogenous Growth Theory**

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Abstract

The approach put forward in this article is based on Schumpeter`s idea of creative destruction, the competitive process by which entrepreneurs are always looking for new ideas that will render their rivals` ideas obsolete. By focusing explicitly on innovation as an economic activity with different economic causes and effects, this article tries to open the door to a deeper understanding of how labor market rigidities in form of wage structure rigidities affect long-run growth through their effects on economic agent`s incentives to engage in innovative or more generally knowledge-producing activities. That is, to the extent that wage structure rigidities limits the ability of a successful innovator to capture monopoly rents from his or her innovations, it will be harmful to growth and employment.

Keywords: Innovation, labor market rigidity, wage (structure) rigidity, economic growth, unemployment.

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Introduction

The increase in material well-being that has taken place in industrialized countries since the second world war has been characterized by technical progress and innovations. Openness to technical change and innovation is a salient characteristic of the nations that become economic leaders of their time.

Innovations do not fall like manna from heaven. Innovative activities are conditioned by income, laws, institutions, customs, and regulations affecting the incentives to invest in human capital and technological knowledge and the ability to appropriate rents from newly created knowledge.

The purpose of this article is to seek some understanding of the interplay between technological progress and structural characteristics, especially wage structure rigidities. The approach put forward in this article is based on Schumpeter's idea of creative destruction, the competitive process by which entrepreneurs are always looking for new ideas that will render their rivals' ideas obsolete. Firms surviving the competitive struggle do so not so much by varying price and quantities as by improving qualities (for example product innovations).

Using mainstream economic theory it is nearly impossible to capture the vision of economic life as a process of perpetual change and innovation through competition. For example, the general equilibrium theory that dominates the mainstream is one in which the product space is given, technology is given, firms are mere placeholders for technological possibilities available to everyone¹. Thus the neoclassical growth model assumed technological progress to be exogenous not because this is a realistic assumption, but because it is the only manageable one within this framework. The vision of the neoclassical growth theory puts capital accumulation at the heart of the growth process.

Schumpeter's idea of perpetual technical change and innovation through competition however can be modeled within the endogenous innovation growth theory. The excitement of endogenous innovation growth theory is providing tools to handle endogenous technological change and innovation within a dynamic general equilibrium setting. The object of the Schumpeterian approach to endogenous growth theory is not to supplant capital accumulation as an explanation of economic growth but to supplement it. Both capital accumulation and innovation are crucial ingredients for growth to be sustained. „The problem with neoclassical theory is not that it analyzes capital accumulation but that it does *not* analyze technological

¹ Technological knowledge is modeled as a public good. In reality however, firms have only a local and very limited knowledge of existing technologies (Eliasson 1990). They do not have timeless and costless access to any technology other than they use. This is due to the fact that the access to other technologies requires learning by doing, and firm and product specific human capital and knowledge.

progress. The purpose of endogenous growth theory is to fill this gap in neoclassical theory – to open up technological progress and innovation to systematic analysis, and to study their effects on growth, not to show that they explain everything“ (Aghion and Howitt 1998, p. 7).

By focusing explicitly on innovation as an economic activity with different economic causes and effects, this article tries to open the door to a deeper understanding of how labor market rigidities in form of wage structure rigidities affect long-run growth through their effects on economic agent`s incentives to engage in innovative or more generally knowledge-producing activities. That is, to the extent that wage structure rigidities limits the ability of a successful innovator to capture monopoly rents from his or her innovations, it will be harmful to growth.

The model presented in this article relies on the notion of a steady state, in which output, wages, and knowledge all grow at the same constant rate. Due to the fact that innovations (especially drastic innovations) often have effects that takes decades to work out, I am primarily interested in the long run. Steady state analysis is a convenient analytical device for modeling the long run. In some cases however steady state analysis may be a misleading device, because temporary effects (short run analysis) might persist for generations before fully disappearing. Nevertheless, steady state analysis is a starting point from which a more complete dynamic analysis should proceed.

First, I present a basic Schumpeterian growth model. This model will be extended by integrating wage structure rigidities in order to analyse the effects of income distribution (in form of wage structure rigidity) on growth.²

A Basic Setup

First, I present a simple model (see Aghion and Howitt 1998, chapter 2) where growth is generated by a random sequence of quality improving (or vertical) innovations that themselves result from uncertain research activities. This model abstracts from capital accumulation completely. Individuals have linear intertemporal preferences.³ The output of the consumption good depends on the input of an intermediate good, x , according to

$$(1) \quad y = Ax^\alpha, \text{ where } 0 < \alpha < 1.$$

Innovations are characterized by a new variety of intermediate good that replaces the old one (vertical innovation). The use of this new intermediate goods raises the technology parameter, A , by the constant factor, $\gamma > 1$. The fixed stock of labor L has two competing uses. It can produce intermediate goods (one for one technology) and labor can also be used in research:

$$(2) \quad L = x + n,$$

² The reverse causation from growth to income distribution (see Aghion and Howitt 1998, chapter 9) is not analysed in this article.

³ This is a useful simplifying assumption, but it is not very realistic, for it implies that the economy as a whole acts like a household with an infinite elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. Such a household has no desire to smooth consumption over time. For instance, if the rate of interest is under or equal the rate of time preference, the household would consume all its income.

where x is the amount of labor used in manufacturing and n is the amount of labor used in research. Innovations arrive randomly with a Poisson arrival rate λn^4 , where $\lambda > 0$. Firms that succeed in innovating can monopolize the intermediate sector until replaced by the next innovator. There is a positive externality (spillover) from the innovation activities in the form that invention makes it possible for other researchers to begin working on the next innovation. There is also a negative externality, whereby the successful monopolist destroys the surplus of the monopolist of the previous generation of intermediate good by making it obsolete.

The research sector is portrayed as in the patent-race literature in the industrial organization literature (see Tirole 1988 and Reinganum 1989). This large literature shares common features: The winner takes all. It builds on uncertainty, characterized by a probability law with known parameter.⁵ Firms are able to compute and maximize expected profits. This literature is mainly concerned with the allocation of resources on Research and Development (R&D) under different market structures.

The amount of labor devoted to research is determined by the arbitrage condition, which reflects the fact that labor can be freely allocated between manufacturing and research, and which can be expressed as

$$(3) \quad w_t = \lambda V_{t+1},$$

where w is the wage, V_{t+1} the discounted expected payoff to the $(t + 1)$ innovator, and t is not the real time but the number of innovations that have occurred. w_t is the value of an hour in the manufacturing sector, whereas λV_{t+1} is the expected value of an hour in research – the flow probability λ of an innovation times the value V_{t+1} . This arbitrage equation governs the dynamics of the economy over its successive innovations.

The value V_{t+1} is just

$$(4) \quad V_{t+1} = \pi_{t+1} / (r + \lambda n_{t+1}).^6$$

The denominator of (4) can be interpreted as the obsolescence-adjusted interest rate showing Schumpeter's idea of creative destruction through competition. The more future research is

⁴ If A and B are two distinct events governed by independent Poisson processes with respective arrival rates a and b , then the flow probabilities that one of the events will occur is just the sum of the two independent flow probabilities a and b , because the probability that both events will occur is negligible. Independent Poisson processes are therefore additive. This is why, when n independent researchers each innovate with a Poisson arrival rate λ , the Poisson arrival rate of innovations to the economy as a whole is the sum λn of the individual arrival rates.

⁵ The evolutionary theory recognizes the highly stochastic nature of innovations and the difficulty of assigning probabilities (see Saviotti and Metcalfe 1991 and Dosi and Nelson 1993). If this were not the case, it would mean that business uncertainty is assumed to be equal to insurable risks (see Eliasson 1985).

⁶ This follows from the following asset equation $rV_{t+1} = \pi_{t+1} - \lambda n_{t+1} V_{t+1}$. rV_{t+1} is the expected income generated by a patent on the $(t+1)^{\text{th}}$ innovation and is equal to the profit flow π_{t+1} attainable by the intermediate good monopolist until he disappears minus the expected loss that will occur when the innovator is replaced by a new innovator and therefore loses V_{t+1} with the probability λn_{t+1} (which is equal with the arrival rate of the innovation). This implicitly assumes that the incumbent innovator does not perform R&D due to the replacement effect, which means that the value to the incumbent innovator of making the next innovation is $V_{t+1} - V_t$. Because the other researchers have immediate access to the incumbent technology (Note that technological knowledge is here modeled as a public good; see footnote 1), the value to an outside researcher is V_{t+1} , which is strictly more than $V_{t+1} - V_t$.

expected, the shorter the likely duration of the monopoly profits, and hence the smaller the payoff of innovating. This introduces a negative dependency of current research upon the amount of expected future research.

Before proceeding, the model has to be entirely specified by determining the profit flow π and the flow demand for manufacturing labor x . Both are determined by a profit-maximization problem. The incumbent innovator will determine π and x by solving

$$(5) \quad \pi_t = \max [p_t(x) x_t - w_t x_t],$$

where $p_t(x)$ is the price at which the innovator can sell x (intermediate input) to the final good sector. Assuming that there is a competitive final good sector, $p_t(x)$ must equal the marginal product of the intermediate input x in producing the final (consumption) good. From equation (1) follows then $p_t(x) = \alpha A_t x^{\alpha-1}$. After substituting for $p_t(x)$ in (5), one yield

$$(6) \quad \pi_t = \max [\alpha A_t x_t^\alpha - w_t x_t].$$

The first order-order condition to the profit-maximization problem yields

$$(7) \quad \frac{\partial \pi_t}{\partial x_t} \Rightarrow x_t = \left(\frac{\alpha A_t}{w_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$$

and after transforming (7) to A_t and then replace A_t in (6), one receive

$$(8) \quad \pi_t = [\alpha A_t x_t^\alpha - w_t x_t] = [(1/\alpha) - 1] w_t x_t.$$

Both π_t and x_t are decreasing functions of the wage w_t . Besides the above negative creative destruction effect exists a second effect inducing a negative dependency of current research on the amount of expected future research: a higher demand for future research will push future productivity of labor and therefore the future productivity-adjusted wage ω_{t+1} (w_{t+1}/A_{t+1}) up, thereby decreasing the future flow of profits to be appropriated by future innovators.

This yields the entirely specified model by

1. the arbitrage equation (after substituting for V_{t+1} and π_{t+1} and dividing both sides of equation (3) by A_t). Labor can be freely allocated between manufacturing and research.⁷

$$(A) \quad w_t = 1 \frac{\overline{gp}(w_{t+1})}{\underbrace{r + I n_{t+1}}_{V_{t+1}}}.$$

2. the labor market clearing equation, reflecting the frictionless nature of the labor market and determining the productivity-adjusted wage ω_t as a function of the residual supply of manufacturing labor $L - n_t$. Assuming a decreasing marginal product of labor (see (1), where $0 < \alpha < 1$), the demand for manufacturing labor is a decreasing function of the wage rate.

$$(L) \quad L = n_t + \bar{x}(w_t).$$

To summarize, the model shows us that there exists a negative relationship between current and future research in equilibrium: a higher level of future research n_{t+1} will both imply more

⁷ This implicitly assumes that no mobility costs exist. In reality, mobility is not costless (for instance, search cost, investment in new human capital and technological knowledge).

creative destruction ($r + \lambda n_{t+1} \uparrow$) and less profit (π_{t+1}) for the next innovator. Therefore current research n_t will decrease.

Steady-State Growth

A steady-state equilibrium is characterized as a stationary solution to (A) and (L), where $\omega \equiv \bar{\omega}$, $n_t \equiv \bar{n}$, and $x_t \equiv \bar{x}$ and wages, profit, and final output are all scaled up by the same $\gamma > 1$ (factor that raises the technology parameter A) each time a new innovation occurs. This yields the equations:

$$(\bar{A}) \quad \bar{w} = I \frac{\bar{g}\bar{p}(\bar{w})}{r + I\bar{n}}.$$

$$(\bar{L}) \quad L = \bar{n} + \bar{x}(\bar{w}).$$

Note that [after replacing x with $L - \bar{n}$; see (2)] in a steady state the productivity-adjusted profit flow is $\bar{\pi} = [(1 - \alpha)/\alpha] \omega (L - \bar{n})$ [see also (8)]. Combining (A) and (L) by putting $\bar{\pi}$ in (A) and dividing by ω yields

$$(9) \quad 1 = I \frac{\bar{g}^{1-a} (L - \bar{n})}{r + I\bar{n}}.$$

From this equation (9), one can derive the following comparative-statics results about the steady-state level of research \bar{n} :

- $r \uparrow \rightarrow \bar{n} \downarrow$: An increase in the rate of interest decreases the marginal benefit to research, by decreasing the present value of the monopoly profits of an innovator [see also V_{t+1} in (A)].
- $\lambda \uparrow \rightarrow \bar{n} \uparrow$: An increase in the arrival parameter decreases both the marginal cost (more effective research) and the marginal benefit of research (higher rate of creative destruction). The former effect dominates.
- $\gamma \uparrow \rightarrow \bar{n} \uparrow$: An increase in the size of each innovation increases the marginal benefit to research, by raising the monopoly profits of the next innovator [see also V_{t+1} in (A)].
- $\alpha \uparrow \rightarrow \bar{n} \downarrow$: Research is a decreasing function of the elasticity of the demand curve faced by the intermediate monopolist.⁸ More product market competition in the intermediate sector decreasing the size of the monopoly rents from a successful innovator, and therefore reduces the incentives to innovate, and because of that reduces the growth rate.
- $L \uparrow \rightarrow \bar{n} \uparrow$: An increase in the stock of skilled workers reduces the wage of the skilled workers, and therefore increases the marginal benefit of research and reduces the marginal cost of research.

⁸ Using equation (1), the elasticity of the demand curve faced by the intermediate monopolist is $(\Delta y / \Delta x) (x / y) = \alpha$.

The steady state flow of the consumption good is $y_t = A_t \bar{x}^\alpha = A_t (L - \bar{n})^\alpha$ which implies $y_{t+1} = A_{t+1} (L - \bar{n})^\alpha = \gamma A_t (L - \bar{n})^\alpha = \gamma y_t$. Therefore, if new innovations occurs, the log of final output increases by an amount equal to $\ln \gamma$ each time an innovation occurs. The real time⁹ interval between innovations is random and exponentially distributed with the (Poisson) arrival parameter $\lambda \bar{n}$. This yields the simple expression for the steady state average growth rate:

$$(10) \quad g = \lambda \bar{n} \ln \gamma.$$

Combining (10) with the above comparative-statics results, one is able to show the impact of parameter changes on g . An increase in the stock of skilled workers L and a reduction of the interest rate r and in the degree of product market competition α will increase \bar{n} and thereby g . An increase in the size of each innovation γ and/ or in the R&D productivity parameter λ will foster growth by increasing directly $\lambda \ln \gamma$ and indirectly through increasing \bar{n} .

Welfare analysis

Yet to use these models for policy design, it is necessary to take the externalities caused by the diffusion of innovations into account. When comparing the above equation (9) with the socially optimal level of research n^* (see Aghion and Howitt 1998, p. 61)

$$(11) \quad 1 = I \frac{(\gamma-1) \left(\frac{1}{a} \right) (L - n^*)}{r + \lambda n^* - \gamma \lambda n^*},$$

one can see three differences between (9) and (11):

- The social discount rate $r + \lambda n - \gamma \lambda n$ is less than the private discount $r + \lambda n$ (because $\gamma > 1$). This is due to a positive externality called „intertemporal technological knowledge spillover effect“: The social planner takes it into account that an innovation makes it possible for the next innovator to begin working on the present technological knowledge (that means the benefit of the present innovation to the next innovation), whereas the private research firm attaches no weight to the benefits accruing beyond the succeeding innovation. This effect generates too little research under laissez-faire and the average growth rate is less than optimal.
- The factor $(1 - \alpha)$ in (9) will be replaced with 1 in (11). This is due to the „appropriability effect“: The private monopolist is unable to capture the whole consumer surplus created by the intermediate good; he captures only $(1 - \alpha)$ of that output. This effect generates also too little research under laissez-faire and the average growth rate is less than optimal.
- $(\gamma - 1)$ in (11) replaces γ in (9). This is due to the „business-stealing effect“: The successful monopolist destroys the surplus of the previous monopolist by making the previous generation of intermediate good obsolete. A social planner takes into account that a new innovation destroys the social return from previous innovations. This effect generates also too much research under laissez-faire and the average growth rate is greater than optimal.

One can now summarize the welfare implications of introducing creative destruction:

⁹ Note that t in this model does not refer to real time, but rather to the sequence of innovations.

1. If the intertemporal technological knowledge spillover effect and the appropriability effect dominates the business stealing effect, **laissez-faire growth will be less than optimal** ($\hat{n} < n^*$).
2. Note that if the business stealing effect dominates the intertemporal technological knowledge spillover effect and the appropriability effect, **laissez-faire growth will be excessive** ($\hat{n} > n^*$). Or in more general words: If the extent of negative externalities induced by innovations is greater than the extent of positive externalities induced by innovations, the average growth rate is greater than optimal. This new implication is a very important result of welfare analysis introducing creative destruction in the process of economic growth. In reality there also exist further important negative spillovers which make excessive laissez-faire growth possible. For example, if we introduce (human) capital in the model argumentation, the cost of (human) capital is also affected by obsolescence caused by new waves of innovations. In other words: The successful monopolist destroys to a certain degree¹⁰ the previous (human) capital stock of the previous monopolist by making the previous capital stock or technological knowledge obsolete.

Rigid and Flexible Labor Markets: Some Remarks to a Long-Term Structural Component of the European Unemployment

In recent economic literature, two important labor market developments of the last two decades have attracted much attention (see Bertola and Ichino 1995): Decreasing wage dispersion of European labor markets and increasing and persistent unemployment in Europe, and widening wage differentials across U.S. workers and decreasing and less persistent unemployment in the U.S.A.. While in the U.S.A. technological change has been absorbed by larger wage inequality, in Europe the preference for compressed and rigid wage differentials has priced out of the labor market a large number of workers, thereby causing higher unemployment among unskilled workers.

In other words: Stable wage differentials are accompanied by persistently high unemployment. Wage rigidities may have prevented European labor markets from reacting to skill-biased technological progress by reducing the relative low-end wages (see Krugman 1994 and Wood 1994). If compressed wage differentials and relative rigid low-end wages clashed with reduced demand for low-skill labor (because of the technological progress in form of process innovation), then the unemployment rate of low-skill European workers will raise. This effect was strengthened the last two decades by the increasing openness to trade with developing countries (especially with tradable goods), because the stock of cheap unskilled labor has been

¹⁰ The degree depends on the form of the production technology, or more exactly to the extent one can use the old (human) capital stock in the production of the new intermediate good. For example, if you have a putty clay technology, that is old machines (or old human capital) cannot be used in the production of the new goods, the old (human) capital stock will be entirely destroyed by the innovation of new intermediate goods. In this case, the extent of the negative externality is very large.

increased. This threatens the wage of unskilled workers in advanced economies. In full-employment equilibrium, the competition from developing countries decreases low-skill wages, and prices the unskilled out of work if their wages fail to respond.

In Europe, institutional rigidities reduce wage dispersion and employment fluctuations. In „flexible“ markets, the mobility decisions of workers and „flexible“ wage differentials ensure that efficient labor reallocation does take place in equilibrium, whereas in „rigid“ markets, where non-competitive central wage setting takes place, labor reallocation is inefficient.

In modern advanced economies, employment relationships entail highly (firm) specific human capital. Therefore mobility is costly and time consuming. In flexible labor markets where mobility costs (e.g. investment in human capital and technological knowledge) are paid by workers, the wage differentials needed to trigger labor reallocation are larger in a more volatile economic environment. In „rigid“ labor markets where wages are constrained by institutional rigidities, the model as presented in this article suggests that a similar increase in the volatility of the economic environment should be associated to inefficient labor reallocation (from the manufacturing sector into the R&D sector), thereby lower aggregate innovation activities and therefore lower long-term economic growth. A suboptimal lower economic growth rate - that means that the economy doesn't work at full capacity because innovative activities are suboptimal low - in turn decreases the long-term employment rate. Together with a constant or increasing stock of labor supply, this will induce unemployment.

Wage Structure Rigidity and Economic Growth

Two main approaches exist to a theoretical analysis of the structure of wages. The market approach would seek to apply theories of competition or of marginalism to relative rates of wage payment in different firms, industries, areas and occupations and to changes in these rates. In its pure perfect form this approach must assume the existence of a representative rational, profit-maximizing firm who demand labor -that may somehow be regarded as homogenous- according to its marginal physical product and a supply of homogenous labour produced by competing households. In this approach wage structure rigidity problems doesn't exist.

It is agreed that even if employers do aim maximizing profits they cannot perform the necessary marginal calculations, including that of the value of the marginal physical product of labor, required as a basis of marginal wage theory. In reality, the forces finally determining the wage structure will be such institutional factors as bargaining power, the climate of public opinion and the like. This leads us to the second approach. Therefore the wage positions are attributed to various pressures whose main characteristics is that they are not strictly economic. Influence of bargaining power, location, public opinion, tradition, organisations, there and others play an important role in the establishment of wages structure. Wage structures are replete with historical hangovers (differentials based for example on crafts,

locality or sex) which perhaps are more conventional than logical. This will lead to persistent wage differentials.

Innovations do not fall like manna from heaven. Skills and competences are very important in increasing the individual's capacity to innovate and adapting to new technologies, thereby speeding up the technological diffusion throughout the economy. The economic literature shows that human capital is very important for sustainable economic growth because in reality there exists a strong complementarity between human capital and Research & Development investments and between human capital and the diffusion of innovations. Not only the structure, but also the level of human capital (Nelson and Phelps 1966) is important because it affects a country's ability to innovate or catch up with more advanced countries. Human capital is also necessary in order to convert R&D results into marketable products.

I now assume that innovative activities are strongly conditioned by income affecting the incentives to invest in human capital and technological knowledge. Assuming that technological progress generates a higher relative demand for skilled labor, competitive labor markets, where wages are decentrally set, increases wage differentials across skill levels. Income increases or a relative better-off position in the hierarchy of the wage structure then increases the incentives to invest in human capital and technological knowledge and therefore foster innovative activities and thereby economic growth.

If there exist wage structure rigidities, the wage differential remains constant. What does that mean in reality? Now, if a worker in the research sector (or a worker in the manufacturing sector by learning by doing) makes a successful innovation and therefore increases the productivity of the whole economy, wage structure rigidity means that both the wage of the worker in the research sector (or manufacturing worker) making the innovation and the wage of the non-innovative manufacturing worker (or more general: the wage of the other workers) increases with the same rate. In other more general words:

If there exists wage structure rigidities in the real economic world, an innovator is not able to capture the whole (income) surplus created by his innovation.

This will reduce the incentives to invest in human capital and technological knowledge and therefore reduce the innovative activities in the whole economy. This main result is to be valid for all kind of innovations, both for fundamental innovative activities in R&D or secondary innovative activities (for instance product or process innovations through learning by doing).¹¹

The basic idea is therefore that the existence of wage structure rigidities (wsr) has in the basic Schumpeterian approach the same implication as redistributing a part of the innovation rent V away from the successful innovator. Therefore, one can introduce the problem of wage structure rigidities (wsr) in the basic model by replacing the innovation rent V with $(1 - \tau)V$,

¹¹ Note that in reality fundamental and secondary research are complementary activities. The fundamental knowledge generated by research and development could only be exploited entirely when a firm puts that knowledge into practice and resolve the unexpected problems and opportunities that only experience can reveal.

where τ is the redistribution rate. The integration of τ is surely an ad-hoc¹² extension of the model, but this extension will show us some new interesting insights in the dynamic welfare analysis of wage (structure) rigidities.

Formally this will yield the following research arbitrage equation:

$$(3^{wsr}) \quad w_t = \lambda(1 - \tau)V_{t+1},$$

so that the steady state equilibrium level of research n^{wsr} is determined by

$$(9^{wsr}) \quad 1 = l \frac{g(1-t)^{\frac{1-a}{a}}(L-n^{wsr})}{r + l n^{wsr}}.$$

One can see that the integration of wage structure rigidity in form of the redistribution rate τ will reduce the research incentives and therefore the steady growth rate. An increase in the degree of the wage structure rigidity or analog an increase in the redistribution rate will negatively affect the level of research and therefore the average growth rate $g = \lambda n^{wsr} \ln \gamma$.

The integration of τ therefore yield some new interesting insights in the dynamic welfare analysis of wage (structure) rigidities:

- I. If the intertemporal technological knowledge spillover effect and the appropriability effect dominates the business stealing effect, **laissez-faire growth will be less than optimal** ($\hat{n} < n^*$). In this case, wage structure rigidities (wsr) will induce a further decrease in the welfare, because $n^{wsr} < \hat{n} < n^*$. This means that wsr not only induce static inefficiencies¹³ but also dynamic inefficiencies in form of an inefficient labor reallocation process. However, the labor-force reallocation plays a very important role in the process of technological progress. An inefficient adjustment process due to wage structure rigidities (e.g. in the decision to invest in human capital or technological knowledge) reduces the innovative activities of an economy and thereby the long-term economic growth. This in turn induces long-term decreases in the employment rate.
- II. If the extent of negative externalities induced by innovations is greater than the extent of positive externalities induced by innovations, **laissez-faire growth will be excessive** ($\hat{n} > n^*$). Or in more general words: the average growth rate is greater than optimal. In this case, **wage structure rigidities will induce an increase in the welfare**, because $n^* < n^{wsr} < \hat{n}$. This is a new very important result of the dynamic analysis of wage structure

¹² This is an ad-hoc assumption due to the fact that the model doesn't include an adequate microeconomic theory of the wage determination including for example the supply and demand side of heterogenous labor, market forces or competition of various kind of labors. But this deficit doesn't change the main conclusions of the model. In order to model wage structure rigidities more realistic, one have to extend the basic model for example by integrating more kinds of labor (for example skilled and unskilled labor) and then endogenizing the different wage paths both of the skilled and the unskilled. The Schumpeterian paradigm can therefore be fruitfully developed in this way.

¹³ The main focus of the static (microeconomic) labor market theory (for instance, efficiency wage theory, theory of implicit contracts, job search theory) is to examine the (static) effects of wage rigidity on unemployment.

rigidities. Such dynamic interactions remain unexplained by static models of wage determination.

Conclusions and Outlook

The simple dynamic model presented in this article offers further insights into the structural features of economic growth and European unemployment. The integration of wage structure rigidities in form of the redistribution rate τ is surely an ad-hoc extension of the basic Schumpeterian growth model, but this simple extension will show us some new interesting insights in the dynamic analysis of wage (structure) rigidities.

Dynamics are very important in reality. Due to the fact that the static and dynamic structure of the industrialized countries changes continuously, labor-force reallocation plays a very important role in the process of long-term economic growth induced by technical progress. Inasmuch as mobility is costly (e.g. investment in human capital or technological knowledge) for workers, equilibrium wage differentials may offer dynamic compensation for such costs. However, in „rigid“ labor markets (e.g. the European or German labor market) where labor reallocation is hampered by centralized wage setting, wage structure rigidities reduce or eliminate workers` incentives to bear mobility costs in form of investing in human capital or technological knowledge. These inefficiencies in the labor reallocation process due to wage structure rigidities reduces the innovative activities of an economy and thereby the long-term economic growth. Income inequality is therefore essentially for innovative activities and should be viewed as being growth-enhancing.¹⁴

A lower long-term economic growth rate in turn induces long-term decreases in the employment rate. Together with an constant or increasing stock of labor supply¹⁵ (e.g. in Germany), this could be a dynamic explanation of the increasing and persistent unemployment in Europe due to labor market rigidities.

Inasmuch as a „rigid“ labor market structure can have desirable labor-income stabilization effects, European (especially German) institutions may well be inspired by a desire to shelter individual workers` welfare from shocks, at the cost of dynamic inefficiencies in the labor reallocation process.

Due to the increasing openness to trade and increasing national and international division of labor and thereby increasing the rate of innovations and competitive pressures „flexible“ markets are a more important determinant of outcomes and structural change than in the past. Therefore, the results of the dynamic model presented in this article are consistent with the common view that labor-market flexibility has become an increasingly important determinant of market performance in the last two decades, especially in a more volatile economic

¹⁴ Aghion and Howitt (1998) point in Chapter 9 to several important reasons why excessive inequality may reduce investment opportunities and thereby discourage growth.

¹⁵ For instance, because of an increasing openness to trade or an increasing labor-force participation of women.

environment. Therefore, if generalized instability has increased the returns to flexibility, rigid institutions may have become too costly in terms of efficiency.

However, a new very important result is that if the extent of negative externalities induced by innovations is greater than the extent of positive externalities induced by innovations, wage structure rigidities will induce an increase in the welfare by decreasing the excessive laissez-faire growth rate. Such dynamic interactions remain unexplained by static models.

The simple endogenous growth model discussed above are not meant to be fully realistic, and should be complicated in a number of directions in order to discuss labor market issues in a dynamic economic environment:

- The interaction between endogenous human capital and wage structure, technological change and economic growth should be integrated. Therefore the R&D endogenous growth models should endogenize the wage determination process and the training decisions of firms or investment decisions of the households in human capital and technological knowledge, because these decisions may be crucial to win the patent race for the innovation and/ or to obtain a successful implementation of the innovation. This will provide new insights into how endogenous technological change influences private incentives to accumulate human capital and technological knowledge through relative wage movements.
- Skilled labor should be assumed to be an essential input not only in R&D, but also in education and in the absorption of innovations into production.
- Innovation and capital accumulation are complementary processes. Technological change affects productivity by improving the quality of machinery and equipment. In other words: New technologies are for the most part embodied in new forms of human and physical capital that must be accumulated if the technology is to be used. Therefore the (human) capital accumulation process have to be integrated in the above discussion.
- Technical progress destroys old jobs at the same time as it creates new ones. Productivity growth is thus essentially re-allocative. This labor reallocation process depends on the degree of the adjustment of the human capital structure of an economy. The question is whether faster technical progress creates unemployment („human capital mismatch“) or reduce unemployment („job creation“). The relationship between endogenous human capital and wage structure, technological change, economic growth and unemployment should therefore be integrated.
- The interaction between endogenous human capital and wage structure, technological growth and business cycles is also very important. Productivity growth through innovations and the business cycle were closely interrelated.¹⁶ The basic idea is that changes in the business cycle (e.g. aggregate demand shocks) induce changes in the level of real economic

¹⁶ For instance, Aghion and Howitt 1998 (Chapter 8) call into question the traditional division of macroeconomic theory between economic growth trend and business cycles by endogenizing technological knowledge in a model of sustained growth.

activity in the short run (e.g. changes in the investment level of human capital or R&D). This in turn will change the technological growth rate. Therefore, even after individual expectations have fully adjusted, the growth trend will be permanently changed. Analysing the interactions between labor market rigidities, human capital, economic growth and business cycles could therefore reveal new insights in long-term economic growth.

Therefore, this dynamic Schumpeterian perspective on labor-market issues suggests potentially fruitful directions for further theoretical research.

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