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“Three-player round-robin tournaments in the lab: Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions”

Click here for the publication.

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Abstract

‘Resilience and Stability of Economic Networks – Essays in Complexity Economics’

and wishes him all the best for the future!

Are Biases Contagious? The Influence of Communication on Motivated Beliefs

The date is Tuesday, 07th of July, 3 p.m., in room F21/01.30.

Procuring New Ideas: On the Value of Performance Information in Innovation Tournaments

The date is Tuesday, 16th of June, 3 p.m., in room F21/01.30.

Abstract

We use a stylized model of a dynamic innovation tournament to show that the effectiveness of monetary incentives depends on whether contestants receive cardinal, ordinal, or no information about their rival's performance. The model's main implication is that performance information acts as a substitute for prize money in creating incentives to invest in new ideas: The investment-maximizing information policy switches from no to ordinal to cardinal information as the tournament's prize is reduced. A laboratory experiment provides support for our theory but also unveils an unpredicted pattern of behavior capable of overturning the model's conclusions concerning optimal policy.

AI Persuasion and Financial-Decision Making: Experimental Evidence on Dominated Investment Choices
(joint work with Joshua Greubel und Henrik Guhling)

The date is Tuesday, 19th of May, 3 p.m., in room F21/01.30.

Abstract

This study examines how AI-generated financial advice influences investment decisions in situations where individuals choose between two fictitious fund providers, one objectively optimal and one dominated. In a controlled online experiment, participants received either no advice, advice from a human advisor, or AI-generated recommendations presented either neutrally or as originating from the investor’s bank. The results reveal substantial persuasive effects of both human and AI advice. Biased recommendations favoring the dominated option significantly reduced optimal investment choices, particularly when delivered by AI systems. In contrast, advice supporting the optimal provider strongly increased correct decisions, with AI-based recommendations producing the highest rates of optimal choices. Notably, framing AI advice as originating from a bank did not reduce trust in the AI advisor. The findings highlight the powerful influence of AI persuasion in financial decision-making and raise concerns about the potential misuse of AI-driven recommendations in retail investment markets.

A Theory of “Likes”

The date is Tuesday, 27th of January, 3 p.m., in room FG1/00.08.

Abstract

This paper investigates the value of recommendations for disseminating economic information, with a focus on frictions resulting from preference heterogeneity. We consider Bayesian expected-payoff maximizers who receive non-strategic recommendations by other consumers. We show by which channels a recommendation system influences consumer demand and welfare. Our analysis reveals how the welfare-maximizing design of a recommendation system may differ from what a profit-maximizing designer would choose to do.
 

Dr. Sandra Eickmeier, Research Centre - Deutsche Bundesbank
will speak on
Tuesday, 20th of Jan 2026, 6:30 pm in room U7/01.05.

Further dates of the lecture series can be found at www.uni-bamberg.de/bwl-bfc-sf/

„Successful Voting in Weighted Committees and Shareholder Meetings”

The date is Tuesday, 13th of January, 3 p.m., in room FG1/00.08.

Abstract

The applicable voting rule determines how closely collective decisions between three or more options reflect the preferences of a given individual. We construct measures of this and ask if a specific decision maker is more successful using plurality voting, plurality with a runoff vote, pairwise majority voting or the Borda scoring method. Our first benchmark finding is that if all voting weights are equal, then plurality rule maximizes the probability of obtaining one's individual top choice and Borda rule maximizes the voter-specific average ranking of the outcome. This result generalizes to asymmetric weights in aggregate terms but not from a single voter's perspective. We use computational methods to identify the individually most advantageous rule for any given weight distribution among three generic voters and also for the ten largest shareholders in S&P 100 corporations. Practical recommendations for the latter coincide in unexpectedly many cases with the analytical benchmark for equal weights. We also find that the Borda rule translates voting weights into voting success the most transparently and that traditional power indices for binary voting games approximate success in weighted committees well.

You can also have a look at the document:

ssrn.com/abstract=5666752 
 

Prof. Dr. Achim Truger, Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung ("Wirtschaftsweise") / Institut für Sozioökonomie an der Universität Duisburg-Essen
will speak on
Tuesday, 16th of Dec 2025, 6:30 pm in room U7/01.05.

Further dates of the lecture series can be found at www.uni-bamberg.de/bwl-bfc-sf/