A Theory of “Likes”

halten wird.

Termin ist Dienstag, der 27. Januar 2026, von 15.00h (s.t.) – 16.00h in Raum FG1/00.08

Abstract

This paper investigates the value of recommendations for disseminating economic information, with a focus on frictions resulting from preference heterogeneity. We consider Bayesian expected-payoff maximizers who receive non-strategic recommendations by other consumers. We show by which channels a recommendation system influences consumer demand and welfare. Our analysis reveals how the welfare-maximizing design of a recommendation system may differ from what a profit-maximizing designer would choose to do.
 

Dr. Sandra Eickmeier, Research Centre - Deutsche Bundesbank
trägt am
Di, den 20.01.2026, 18.30 Uhr, in Raum U7/01.05 vor.

Weitere Termine der Ringvorlesung finden sich unter www.uni-bamberg.de/bwl-bfc-sf/

„Successful Voting in Weighted Committees and Shareholder Meetings”

halten wird.

Termin ist Dienstag, der 13. Januar 2026, von 15.00h (s.t.) – 16.00h in Raum FG1/00.08

Abstract

The applicable voting rule determines how closely collective decisions between three or more options reflect the preferences of a given individual. We construct measures of this and ask if a specific decision maker is more successful using plurality voting, plurality with a runoff vote, pairwise majority voting or the Borda scoring method. Our first benchmark finding is that if all voting weights are equal, then plurality rule maximizes the probability of obtaining one's individual top choice and Borda rule maximizes the voter-specific average ranking of the outcome. This result generalizes to asymmetric weights in aggregate terms but not from a single voter's perspective. We use computational methods to identify the individually most advantageous rule for any given weight distribution among three generic voters and also for the ten largest shareholders in S&P 100 corporations. Practical recommendations for the latter coincide in unexpectedly many cases with the analytical benchmark for equal weights. We also find that the Borda rule translates voting weights into voting success the most transparently and that traditional power indices for binary voting games approximate success in weighted committees well.

Das Papier kann unter folgendem Link eingesehen werden:

ssrn.com/abstract=5666752 
 

Prof. Dr. Achim Truger, Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung ("Wirtschaftsweise") / Institut für Sozioökonomie an der Universität Duisburg-Essen
trägt am
Di, den 16.12.2025, 18.30 Uhr, in Raum U7/01.05 vor.

Weitere Termine der Ringvorlesung finden sich unter www.uni-bamberg.de/bwl-bfc-sf/

Der Vortrag wurden im Rahmen der Lehrveranstaltung “Mikroökonomik II” abgehalten und brachte demnach die Schülerinnen und Schüler mit VWL Studierenden der Studiengänge European Economic Studies und Computational Economic and Politics zusammen. Gemeinsam haben Sie an einem Experiment teilgenommen, das die Problematik von Marktversagen bei öffentlichen Gütern simuliert und damit eine Kernproblematik bei der Klimawende aufzeigt.

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Kurzbeschreibung: Öffentliche Güter zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass bezüglich ihres Konsums keine Rivalität entsteht. Wir führen in der Vorlesung ein Experiment durch, welches zeigt, dass bei der Bereitstellung von Öffentlichen Gütern in der Regel zu wenig investiert wird. In der Praxis findet sich dieses Problem zum Beispiel bei den Investitionen, die zum Erreichen der Klimaschutzziele nötig wären. Wir ergründen die Ursachen dieses Problems und diskutieren verschiedene Lösungsmöglichkeiten.

Termin: Mittwoch, 26. November 2025 von 8:30 Uhr bis 10:00 Uhr
Ort: Universität Bamberg, Feldkirchenstraße 21, Raum F21/01.57
Zielgruppe: Schüler*innen der Oberstufe, insbes. Klassenstufe 11

“Rejected: Career concerns in the refereeing process”

halten wird.

Termin ist Dienstag, der 09. Dezember 2025, von 15.00h (s.t.) – 16.00h in Raum FG1/00.08

We analyze the effect of career concerns on the refereeing process. We consider a journal editor and two referees who may differ in reputation and ability. A referee’s reputation is public information,
while a referee’s ability is private information. We identify an incentive for low-ability referees to reject good papers —a phenomenon we call over-rejection— and find that this incentive increases with the referee’s reputation. We show that over-rejection decreases with competition, referee homogeneity, and the anonymity of the refereeing process. In contrast to low-ability experts, high-ability referees are sincere in equilibrium. Since a referee with a higher reputation is ex-ante more likely to be high-ability, our results suggest that the probability of rejection is inverted U-shaped in the referee’s reputation. We empirically test this result. We use data from Card and DellaVigna (2020) for submissions to four top economic journals in the period 2003-2013 and use the referee’s publication record as a proxy for the referee’s reputation. We find that the probability of sending a negative recommendation increases with the referee’s reputation for referees with a lower publication record and decreases thereafter, suggesting an inverted U-shaped form in line with our theoretical results.

“Tolerance and polarization: The role of popularity networks"

halten wird.

Termin ist Montag, der 08. Dezember 2025, von 14.00h (s.t.) – 16.00h in Raum FG1/00.08

Individuals (political parties) often differ in their identities (ideologies), i.e., the behaviors they consider ideal. Nevertheless, in order to be accepted by others they must compromise, i.e, choose costly actions to get closer to others’ ideal values. Based on the paper by Genicot (2022) on tolerance and compromise we construct a two-stage model in which agents first choose actions and secondly, a pairwise stable network forms. The novelty of our approach is that tolerance levels depend endogenously on the degree of agents in the network. In particular, the more popular an individual is the more she/he is tolerated by others. Assuming uniformly distributed identities and optimistic individuals (i.e., no coordination failure in the link formation stage), we characterize a family of two distinct network structures in equilibrium: lattices and bridges. Following the polarization measure introduced by Esteban et al. (2007) we show that, in equilibrium, there is co-existence of cohesive and polarized societies depending on the identity and number of leaders (versus followers). Thus, ex ante identical societies could exhibit substantially different polarization levels due to the endogeneity of popularity.

Katrin Reich, Chair of the Joint Initiative on Circular Economy ( JICE) und International
Development Finance Club (IDFC) – KfW
trägt am
Di, den 02.12.2025, 18.30 Uhr, in Raum U7/01.05 vor.

Weitere Termine der Ringvorlesung finden sich unter www.uni-bamberg.de/bwl-bfc-sf/

Die Einwahldaten hierzu lauten:

us02web.zoom.us/j/86438909217

Meeting-ID: 864 3890 9217

Viel Erfolg!
 

Das Institut für VWL freut sich ankündigen zu können, dass Prof. Dr. Marion Ott, ZEW & Uni Gießen, innerhalb des BERG-Research Seminar einen Vortrag zum Thema

“Bid heterogeneity and winner’s curse in multi-unit auctions”

halten wird.

Termin ist Dienstag, den 25. November 2025, von 15.00h (s.t.) – 16.00h in Raum FG1/00.08

Abstract

The winner's curse is prevalent in empirical common value auctions. Motivated by auctions for renewable energy support, we examine how the number of goods — that is, the level of competition for a given number of bidders — affects the winner's curse.  We theoretically and experimentally investigate reverse auctions for multiple units of a common-cost good and bidders with single-unit supply. With both discriminatory pricing and uniform pricing, bidders' profits in the experiment increase and the frequency of a loss decreases as the number of goods increases. With uniform pricing and a sufficient number of goods, bidders even perform better than in equilibrium. The observed pattern does not support theoretical predictions of better bidders' performance with discriminatory pricing than with uniform pricing and a worsening of their performance in the number of goods under uniform pricing. However, a model of bid heterogeneity and dispersed bids replicates the observed pattern. Dispersion strengthens the winner's curse in discriminatory auctions, but has a weaker effect the larger the number of goods. With uniform pricing, dispersion may protect from the winner's curse if the number of goods is sufficiently large, as observed in the experiment. Thus, with a low competition level and uniform pricing, the winner's curse may vanish.